We consider the problem of minimizing a smooth convex function by reducing the optimization to computing the Nash equilibrium of a particular zero-sum convexconcave game. Zero-sum games can be solved using online learning dynamics, where a classical technique involves simulating two no-regret algorithms that play against each other and, after T rounds, the average iterate is guaranteed to solve the original optimization problem with error decaying as O(log T /T ). In this paper we show that the technique can be enhanced to a rate of O(1/T 2 ) by extending recent work [25, 28] that leverages optimistic learning to speed up equilibrium computation. The resulting optimization algorithm derived from this analysis coincides exactly with the well-known NESTEROVACCELERATION [19] method, and indeed the same story allows us to recover several variants of the Nesterov's algorithm via small tweaks. We are also able to establish the accelerated linear rate for a function which is both strongly-convex and smooth. This methodology unifies a number of different iterative optimization methods: we show that the HEAVYBALL algorithm is precisely the non-optimistic variant of NESTEROVAC-CELERATION, and recent prior work already established a similar perspective on FRANKWOLFE [2, 1].
Introduction
One of the most successful and broadly useful tools recently developed within the machine learning literature is the no-regret framework, and in particular online convex optimization (OCO) [31] . In the standard OCO setup, a learner is presented with a sequence of (convex) loss functions ℓ 1 (·), ℓ 2 (·), . . ., and must make a sequence of decisions x 1 , x 2 , . . . from some set K in an online fashion, and observes ℓ t after only having committed to x t . Assuming the sequence {ℓ t } is chosen by an adversary, the learner aims is to minimize the average regretR T := 1 T T t=1 ℓ t (x t ) − min x∈K T t=1 ℓ t (x) against any such loss functions. Many simple algorithms have been developed for OCO problems-including MIRRORDESCENT, FOLLOWTHEREGULAR-IZEDLEADER, FOLLOWTHEPERTURBEDLEADER, etc.-and these algorithms exhibit regret guarantees that are strong even against adversarial opponents. Under very weak conditions one can achieve a regret rate ofR T = O(1/ √ T ), or evenR T = O(log T /T ) with required curvature on ℓ t .
One can apply online learning tools to several problems, but perhaps the simplest is to find the approximate minimum of a convex function argmin x∈K f (x). With a simple reduction we set ℓ t = f , and it is easy to show that, via Jensen's inequality, the average iteratex T := such as FRANKWOLFE and HEAVYBALL achieve convergence rates of O(1/T ), whereas the nowfamous NESTEROVACCELERATION algorithm achieves a rate of O(1/T 2 ). The fast rate shown by Nesterov was quite surprising at the time, and many researchers to this day find the result quite puzzling. There has been a great deal of work aimed at providing a more natural explanation of acceleration, with a more intuitive convergence proof [30, 4, 11] . This is indeed one of the main topics of the present work, and we will soon return to this discussion.
Another application of the no-regret framework is the solution of so-called saddle-point problems, which are equivalently referred to as Nash equilibria for zero-sum games. Given a function g(x, y) which is convex in x and concave in y (often called a payoff function), define V * = inf x∈K sup y g(x, y). An ǫ-equilibrium of g(·, ·) is a pairx,ŷ such that such that V * − ǫ ≤ inf x∈K g(x,ŷ) ≤ V * ≤ sup y g(x, y) ≤ V * + ǫ.
One can find an approximate saddle point of the game with the following setup: implement a noregret learning algorithm for both the x and y players simultaneously, after observing the actions {x t , y t } t=1...T return the time-averaged iterates (x,ŷ) = . A simple proof shows that (x,ŷ) is an approximate equilibrium, with approximation bounded by the average regret of both players (see Theorem 1) . In the case where the function g(·, ·) is biaffine, the no-regret reduction guarantees a rate of O(1/ √ T ), and it was assumed by many researchers this was the fastest possible using this framework. But one of the most surprising online learning results to emerge in recent years established that no-regret dynamics can obtain an even faster rate of O(1/T ). Relying on tools developed by [9] , this fact was first proved by [24] and extended by [28] . The new ingredient in this recipe is the use of optimistic learning algorithms, where the learner seeks to benefit from the predictability of slowly-changing inputs {ℓ t }.
We will consider solving the classical convex optimization problem min x f (x), for smooth functions f , by instead solving an associated saddle-point problem which we call the Fenchel Game. Specifically, we consider that the payoff function g of the game to be g(x, y) = x, y − f * (y).
where f * (·) is the fenchel conjugate of f (·). This is an appropriate choice of payoff function since, V * = min x f (x) and sup y g(x, y) = sup y x, y − f * (y) = f (x). Therefore, by the definition of an ǫ-equilibrium, we have that Lemma 1. If (x,ŷ) is an ǫ-equilibrium of the Fenchel Game (2) , then f (x) − min x f (x) ≤ ǫ.
One can imagine computing the equilibrium of the Fenchel game using no-regret dynamics, and indeed this was the result of recent work [2] establishing the FRANKWOLFE algorithm as precisely an instance of two competing learning algorithms.
In the present work we will take this approach even further.
1. We show that, by considering a notion of weighted regret, we can compute equilibria in the Fenchel game at a rate of O(1/T 2 ) using no-regret dynamics where the only required condition is that f is smooth. This improves upon recent work [1] on a faster FRANKWOLFE method, which required strong convexity of f (see Appendix J). 2. We show that the secret sauce for obtaining the fast rate is precisely the use of an optimistic no-regret algorithm, OPTIMISTICFTL [1] , combined with appropriate weighting scheme. 3. We show that, when viewed simply as an optimization algorithm, this method is identically the original NESTEROVACCELERATION method. In addition, we recover several variants of NESTEROVACCELERATION (see [18, 20, 22] ) using small tweaks of the framework. 4. We show that if one simply plays FOLLOWTHELEADER without optimism, the resulting algorithm is precisely the HEAVYBALL. The latter is known to achieve a suboptimal rate in general, and our analysis sheds light on this difference. 5. Under the additional assumption that function f (·) is strongly convex, we show that an accelerated linear rate can also be obtained from the game framework. 6. Finally, we show that the same equilibrium framework can also be extended to composite optimization and lead to a variant of Accelerated Proximal Method. 
where · * denotes the dual norm. Throughout the paper, our goal will be to solve the problem of minimizing an L-smooth function f (·) over a convex set K. We also assume that the optimal solution of x * := argmin x∈K f (x) has finite norm. For any convex function f , its Fenchel conjugate is f * (y) := sup x∈dom(f ) x, y − f (x). If a function f is convex, then its conjugate f * is also convex. Furthermore, when the function f (·) is strictly convex, we have that ∇f (x) = argmax y x, y −f * (y).
Suppose we are given a differentiable function φ(·), then the Bregman divergence V c (x) with respect to φ(·) at a point c is defined as
for any x, c ∈ dom(φ), we say that φ(·) is a σ-strongly convex function with respect to · . Throughout the paper we assume that φ(·) is 1-strongly convex.
No-regret zero-sum game dynamics. Let us now consider the process of solving a zero-sum game via repeatedly play by a pair of online learning strategies. The sequential procedure is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1
Computing equilibrium using no-regret algorithms 1: Input: sequence α 1 , . . . , α T > 0 2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
3:
y-player selects y t ∈ Y = R d by OAlg y .
4:
x-player selects x t ∈ X by OAlg x , possibly with knowledge of y t .
5:
y-player suffers loss ℓ t (y t ) with weight α t , where ℓ t (·) = −g(x t , ·).
6:
x-player suffers loss h t (x t ) with weight α t , where h t (·) = g(·, y t ).
In this paper, we consider Fenchel game with weighted losses depicted in Algorithm 1, following the same setup as [1] . In this game, the y-player plays before the x-player plays and the x-player sees what the y-player plays before choosing its action. The y-player receives loss functions α t ℓ t (·) in round t, in which ℓ t (y) := f * (y) − x t , y , while the x-player see its loss functions α t h t (·) in round t, in which h t (x) := x, y t − f * (y t ). Consequently, we can define the weighted regret of the x and y players as
α-REG
Notice that the x-player's regret is computed relative to x * the minimizer of f (·), rather than the minimizer of T t=1 α t h t (·). Although slightly non-standard, this allows us to handle the unconstrained setting while Theorem 1 still holds as desired.
At times when we want to refer to the regret on another sequence y AT . Finally, for offline constrained optimization (i.e. min x∈K f (x)), we let the decision space of the benchmark/comparator in the weighted regret definition to be X = K; for offline unconstrained optimization, we let the decision space of the benchmark/comparator to be a norm ball that contains the optimum solution of the offline problem (i.e. contains arg min x∈R n f (x)), which means that X of the comparator is a norm ball. We let Y = R d be unconstrained. 
An Accelerated Solution to the Fenchel Game via Optimism
We are going to analyze more closely the use of Algorithm 1, with the help of Theorem 1, to establish a fast method to compute an approximate equilibrium of the Fenchel Game. In particular, we will establish an approximation factor of O(1/T 2 ) after T iterations, and we recall that this leads to a O(1/T 2 ) algorithm for our primary goal of solving min x∈K f (x).
3.1 Analysis of the weighted regret of the y-player (i.e. the gradient player)
A very natural online learning algorithm is FOLLOWTHELEADER, which always plays the point with the lowest (weighted) historical loss
FOLLOWTHELEADER is known to not perform well against arbitrary loss functions, but for strongly convex ℓ t (·) one can prove an O(log T /T ) regret bound in the unweighted case. For the time being, we shall focus on a slightly different algorithm that utilizes "optimism" in selecting the next action:
This procedure can be viewed as an optimistic variant of FOLLOWTHELEADER since the algorithm is effectively making a bet that, while ℓ t (·) has not yet been observed, it is likely to be quite similar to ℓ t−1 . Within the online learning community, the origins of this trick go back to [9] , although their algorithm was described in terms of a 2-step descent method. This was later expanded by [24] who coined the term optimistic mirror descent (OMD), and who showed that the proposed procedure can accelerate zero-sum game dynamics when both players utilize OMD. OPTIMISTICFTL, defined as a "batch" procedure, was first presented in [1] and many of the tools of the present paper follow directly from that work.
For convenience, we'll define δ t (y) := α t (ℓ t (y) − ℓ t−1 (y)). Intuitively, the regret will be small if the functions δ t are not too big. This is formalized in the following lemma. Lemma 2. For an arbitrary sequence {α t , ℓ t } t=1...T , the regret of OPTIMISTICFTL satisfies
Proof. Let L t (y) := t s=1 α s ℓ s (y) and alsoL t (y) := α t ℓ t−1 (y) +
The bound follows by induction on T .
The result from Lemma 2 is generic, and would hold for any online learning problem. But for the Fenchel game, we have a very specific sequence of loss functions, ℓ t (y) := −g(x t , y) = f * (y) − x t , y . With this in mind, let us further analyze the regret of the y player.
For the time being, let us assume that the sequence of x t 's is arbitrary. We definē
. It is critical that we have two parallel sequences of iterate averages for the x-player. Our final algorithm will outputx T , whereas the Fenchel game dynamics will involve computing ∇f at the reweighted averages x t for each t = 1, . . . , T .
To prove the key regret bound for the y-player, we first need to state some simple technical facts.
y t = ∇f ( x t ) (following same reasoning as above), (6)
Equations 5 
Proof. Following Lemma 2, and noting that here we have δ t (y) = α t x t−1 − x t , y , we have
We notice that a similar bound is given in [1] for the gradient player using OPTIMISTICFTL, yet the above result is a stict improvement as the previous work relied on the additional assumption that f (·) is strongly convex. The above lemma depends only on the fact that f has lipschitz gradients.
Analysis of the weighted regret of the x-player
In the present section we are going to consider that the x-player uses MIRRORDESCENT for updating its action, which is defined as follows.
where we recall that the Bregman divergence V x (·) is with respect to a 1-strongly convex regularization φ. Also, we note that the x-player has an advantage in these game dynamics, since x t is chosen with knowledge of y t and hence has knowledge of the incoming loss h t (·).
Lemma 4. Let the sequence of x t 's be chosen according to MIRRORDESCENT. Assume that the Bregman Divergence is uniformly bounded on
, where x * denotes the minimizer of f (·). Assume that the sequence {γ t } t=1,2,... is non-increasing. Then we have
The proof of this lemma is quite standard, and we postpone it to Appendix A. We also note that the benchmark x * is always within a finite norm ball by assumption. We given an alternative to this lemma in the appendix, when γ t = γ is fixed, in which case we can instead use the more natural constant D = V x1 (x * ). 
Proof. We have already done the hard work to prove this theorem. Lemma 1 tells us we can bound the error ofx T by the ǫ error of the approximate equilibrium (x T ,ȳ T ). Theorem 1 tells us that the pair (x T ,ȳ T ) derived from Algorithm 1 is controlled by the sum of averaged regrets of both players,
. But we now have control over both of these two regret quantities, from Lemmas 3 and 4. The right hand side of (10) is the sum of these bounds.
Theorem 2 is somewhat opaque without a specifying the sequence {α t }. But what we now show is that the summation term vanishes when we can guarantee that
At remains constant! This is where we obtain the following fast rate. Corollary 1. Following Theorem 2 with α t = t and for any non-increasing sequence γ t satisfying
Proof.
2 , the choice of {α t , γ t } implies D γt ≤ cDL and
, which ensures that the summation term in (10) is negative. The rest is simple algebra.
A straightforward choice for the learning rate γ t is simple the constant sequence γ t = 1 4L . The corollary is stated with a changing γ t in order to bring out a connection to the classical NESTEROVAC-CELERATION in the following section.
Remark: It is worth dwelling on exactly how we obtained the above result. A less refined analysis of the MIRRORDESCENT algorithm would have simply ignored the negative summation term in Lemma 4, and simply upper bounded this by 0. But the negative terms x t − x t−1 2 in this sum happen to correspond exactly to the positive terms one obtains in the regret bound for the y-player, but this is true only as a result of using the OPTIMISTICFTL algorithm. To obtain a cancellation of these terms, we need a γ t which is roughly constant, and hence we need to ensure that
The final bound, of course, is determined by the inverse quantity 1 AT , and a quick inspection reveals that the best choice of α t = θ(t). This is not the only choice that could work, and we conjecture that there are scenarios in which better bounds are achievable for different α t tuning. We show in Section 4.3 that a linear rate is achievable when f (·) is also strongly convex, and there we tune α t to grow exponentially in t rather than linearly.
Nesterov's methods are instances of our accelerated solution to the game
Starting from 1983, Nesterov has proposed three accelerated methods for smooth convex problems (i.e. [19, 18, 20, 22] . In this section, we show that our accelerated algorithm to the Fenchel game can generate all his methods with some simple tweaks.
Recovering
Nesterov's (1983) method for unconstrained smooth convex problems [19, 18] In this subsection, we assume that the x-player's action space is unconstrained. That is, K = R n . Consider the following algorithm. y-player uses OPTIMISITCFTL as OAlg y : y t = ∇f ( x t ).
3:
x-player uses ONLINEGRADIENTDESCENT as OAlg x :
Proof. For the unconstrained case, we can let the distance generating function of the Bregman divergence to be the squared of L2 norm, i.e. φ(x) := 1 2 x 2 2 . Then, the update becomes
Differentiating the objective w.r.t x and setting it to zero, one will get x t = x t−1 − γ t α t y t .
Having shown that Algorithm 2 is actually our accelerated algorithm to the Fenchel game. We are going to show that Algorithm 2 has a direct correspondence with Nesterov's first acceleration method (Algorithm 3) [19, 18] (see also [27] ).
w t = z t−1 − θ∇f (z t−1 ).
4:
To see the equivalence, let us re-writex t := 1 At t s=1 α s x s of Algorithm 2.
where α t = t and γ t = for all t = 1, 2, . . . , T, w t =x t and z t−1 = x t .
Let us switch to comparing the update of Algorithm 2, which is (11), with the update of the HEAVY-BALL algorithm. We see that (11) has the so called momentum term (i.e. has a (x t−1 −x t−2 ) term). But, the difference is that the gradient is evaluated at
s=1 α s x s , which is the consequence that the y-player plays OPTIMISTICFTL. To elaborate, let us consider a scenario (shown in Algorithm 4) such that the y-player plays FOL-LOWTHELEADER instead of OPTIMISTICFTL.
Algorithm 4 HEAVYBALL algorithm 1: In the weighted loss setting of Algorithm 1:
y-player uses FOLLOWTHELEADER as OAlg y : y t = ∇f (x t−1 ).
Following what we did in (11), we can rewritex t of Algorithm 4 as
by observing that (11) still holds except that ∇f ( x t ) is changed to ∇f (x t−1 ) as the y-player uses FOLLOWTHELEADER now, which give us the update of the Heavy Ball algorithm as (12). Moreover, by the regret analysis, we have the following theorem. The proof is in Appendix C.
2 ) rate since its adopts OPTIMISTICFTL, while the HEAVYBALL algorithm which adopts FTL may not enjoy the fast rate, as the distance terms may not cancel out. The result also conforms to empirical studies that the HEAVYBALL does not exhibit acceleration on general smooth convex problems. w t = (1 − β t )w t−1 + β t x t . 8: end for 9: Output w T . 
The proof is in Appendix E, which requires the regret bound of BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER.
Accelerated linear rate
Nesterov observed that, when f (·) is both µ-strongly convex and L-smooth, one can achieve a rate that is exponentially decaying in T (e.g. page 71-81 of [21]). It is natural to ask if the zero-sum game and regret analysis in the present work also recovers this faster rate in the same fashion. We answer this in the affirmative. Denote κ := = min x f (x). Observe that, in this game, the loss of the y-player in round t is α t ℓ t (y) := α t (f * (y) − x t , y ), while the loss of the x-player in round t is a strongly convex function α t h t (y) :
2 ). The cumulative loss function of the x-player becomes more and more strongly convex over time, which is the key to allowing the exponential growth of the total weight A t that leads to the linear rate. In this setup, we have a "warmup round" t = 0, and thus we denoteÃ t := t s=0 α s which incorporate the additional step into the average. The proof of the following result is in Appendix H. .
Accelerated Proximal Method
In this section, we consider solving composite optimization problems min x∈R n f (x) + ψ(x), where f (·) is smooth convex but ψ(·) is possibly non-differentiable convex (e.g. · 1 ). We want to show that the game analysis still applies to this problem. We just need to change the payoff function g to account for ψ(x). Specifically, we consider the following two-players zero-sum game, min x max y { x, y −f * (y)+ψ(x)}. Notice that the minimax value of the game is min x f (x)+ψ(x), which is exactly the optimum value of the composite optimization problem. Let us denote the proximal operator as prox λψ (v) = argmin x ψ(x) + y-player uses OPTIMISITCFTL as OAlg y : y t = ∇f ( x t ).
x-player uses MIRRORDESCENT with ψ(x) := 4:
We notice that the loss function of the x-player here, α t h t (x) = α t ( x, y t + ψ(x)), is possibly nonlinear. Yet, we can slightly adapt the analysis in Section 3 to show that the weighed averagex T is still an O(1/T 2 ) approximate optimal solution of the offline problem. Please see Appendix I for details. One can view Algorithm 6 as a variant of the so called "Accelerated Proximal Gradient"in [6] . Yet, the design and analysis of our algorithm is simpler than that of [6].
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Proof. The key inequality we need, which can be found in Lemma 1 of [25] (and for completeness is included in Appendix A) is as follows: let y, c be arbitrary, and assume
. Now apply this fact for x + = x t , y = γ t α t y t and c = x t−1 , which provides
So, the weighted regret of the x-player can be bounded by
where (a) holds since the sequence {γ t } is non-increasing and D upper bounds the divergence terms, and (b) follows from the strong convexity of φ, which grants
The above lemma requires a bound D on the divergence terms V xt (x * ), which might be large in certain unconstrained settings -recall that we do no necessarily require that K is a bounded set, we only assume that f (·) is minimized at a point with finite norm. On the other hand, when the x-player's learning rate γ is fixed, we can define the more natural choice D = V x0 (x * ).
Lemma 4 [Alternative]:
Let the sequence of x t 's be chosen according to MIRRORDESCENT, and assume
, where x * denotes the benchmark in α-REG x . Then we
Proof. The proof follows exactly as before, yet γ t = γ t+1 for all t implies that 1 γt+1 − 1 γt = 0 and we may drop the sum in the third line of (14). The rest of the proof is identical.
Lemma 1 of [25]
: Let x ′ = arg min x∈K x, y + V c (x). Then, it satisfies that for any x * ∈ K,
Proof. Recall that the Bregman divergence with respect to the distance generating function φ(·) at a point c is:
Denote F (x) := x, y + V c (x). Since x ′ is the optimal point of arg min x∈K F (x), by optimality,
(16) The last inequality means that 
t(t+1) for any τ ≤ t − 2. Thus, z t−1 = x t . Now observe that if z t−1 = x t , we get w t =x t . To see this, substituting z t−1 = w t−1 + t−2 t+1 (w t−1 − w t−2 ) of line 4 into line 3, we get w t = w t−1 + t−2 t+1 (w t−1 − w t−2 ) − θ∇f (z t−1 ). By using z t−1 = x t and w t−1 =x t−1 , we further get w t =x t−1 + t−2 t+1 (x t−1 −x t−2 ) − θ∇f ( x t ) =x t . We can repeat the argument to show that the correspondence holds for any t, which establishes the equivalency.
Notice that the choice of decreasing sequence {γ t } here can still make the distance terms in (10) cancel out. So, we get O(1/T 2 ) rate by the guarantee.
C Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5 Let α t = t.
Proof. To analyze the guarantee ofx T of Algorithm 4, we use the following lemma about FOL-LOWTHELEADER for strongly convex loss functions.
Corollary 1 from [13]
Let ℓ 1 , ..., ℓ T be a sequence of functions such that for all t ∈ [T ], ℓ t is σ t -strongly convex. Assume that FOLLOWTHELEADER runs on this sequence and for each t ∈ [T ], let θ t be in ∇ℓ t (y t ). Then,
Observe that the y-player plays FOLLOWTHELEADER on the loss function sequence α t ℓ t (y) := α t (− x t , y + f * (y)), whose strong convexity parameter is
L -strongly convex by duality). Also, ∇ℓ t (y t ) = −x t + ∇f * (y t ) = −x t +x t−1 , where the last inequality is due to that if y t = argmax y
duality. So, we have α-REG y AboveCor.
). For the x-player, it is an instance of MIRRORDESCENT, so α-REG
) -approximate optimal solution. Since the distance terms may not cancel out, one may only bound the differences of the distance terms by a constant, which leads to the non-accelerated O(1/T ) rate.
D Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6 Let α t = t. Algorithm 5 with update by option (A) is the case when the y-player uses OPTIMISTICFTL and the x-player adopts MIRRORDESCENT with
Proof.
. Now suppose that the equivalency holds at t − 1, for a t ≥ 2. Then,
where (a) is by induction. So, it holds at t too. Now we are going to show that
The result also means that ∇f (z t ) = ∇f ( x t ) = y t of the y-player who plays Optimistic-FTL in Algorithm 1. Furthermore, it shows that line 5 of Algorithm 5:
is exactly (9) of MIRRORDESCENT in Fenchel game. Also, from (18), the last iterate w T in Algorithm 5 corresponds to the final output of our accelerated solution to Fenchel game, which is the weighted average point that enjoys the guarantee by the game analysis.
E Proof of Theorem 7 Theorem 7 Let α t = t. Algorithm 5 with update by option (B) is the case when the y-player uses OPTIMISTICFTL and the x-player adopts BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER with
Proof. Consider in Fenchel game that the y-player uses OPTIMISTICFTL while the x-player plays according to BTRL:
, where R(·) is a 1-strongly convex function. Define, z = arg min x∈K R(x). Form [1] (also see Appendix F), it shows that BTRL has regret
where x * is the benchmark/comparator defined in the definition of the weighted regret (4).
By combining (8) and (19), we get that
where the last inequality is because η = 1 4L so that the distance terms cancel out. So, by Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 again, we know thatx T is an O( 1 T 2 )-approximate optimal solution of min x∈K f (x). The remaining thing to do is showing thatx T is actually w T of Algorithm 5 with option (B). But, this follows the same line as the proof of Theorem 6. So, we have completed the proof.
F Proof of BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER 's regret
For completeness, we replicate the proof in [1] about the regret bound of BETHEREGULAR-IZEDLEADER in this section.
Theorem 10 of [ [1] ] Let θ t be the loss vector in round t. Let the update of BTRL be x t = arg min x∈K x, L t + 1 η R(x), where R(·) is β-strongly convex. Denote z = arg min x∈K R(x). Then, BTRL has regret
To analyze the regret of BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER, let us consider OPTIMISTICFTRL first. Let θ t be the loss vector in round t and let the cumulative loss vector be L t = t s=1 θ s . The update of OPTIMISTICFTRL is
where m t is the learner's guess of the loss vector in round t, R(·) is β-strong convex with respect to a norm ( · ) and η is a parameter. Therefore, it is clear that the regret of BETHEREGULAR-IZEDLEADER will be the one when OPTIMISTICFTRL 's guess of the loss vectors exactly match the true ones, i.e. m t = θ t . 
where
, and
Recall that the update of BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER is x t = arg min x∈K x, L t + 1 η R(x), Therefore, we have that m t = θ t and x t = z t+1 in the regret bound of OPTIMISTICFTRL indicated by the theorem. Consequently, we get that the regret of BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER satisfies
G Proof of OPTIMISTICFTRL 's regret
For completeness, we replicate the proof in [1] about the regret bound of OPTIMISTICFTRL in this section. 
, and . This implies that f (
Proof. From Lemma 3, we know that the y-player's regret by OPTIMISTICFTL is
For the x-player, its loss function in round t is α t ℓ t (x) := α t (µφ(x) + x, y t ), where φ(
Assume the x-player plays BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER,
where α 0 ℓ 0 (x) := α 0 µφ(x). DenoteÃ
Notice that this is different from A t := t s=1 α s . Then, its regret is (proof is on the next page)
where L 0 is the Lipchitz constant of the 1-strongly convex function φ(x) and x 0 = arg min x φ(x).
Summing (34) and (37), we have
We want to let the distance terms cancel out. 2Lα
which is equivalent to 4Lα
Let us denote the constant θ := αt At > 0.
Notice that 0 < α0 At ≤ 1. It suffices to show that
Yet, we would expect that α0 At is a decreasing function of t, so it suffices to show that
which is equivalent to
It turns out that θ =
satisfies the above inequality, combining the fact that µ L ≤ 1. Therefore, the optimization error ǫ after T iterations is
Proof. (of (37)) First, we are going to use induction to show that
for any x * ∈ X , where
For the base case t = 0, we have
where x 0 is defined as x 0 = arg min x∈X α 0 µφ(x). Now suppose it holds at t = τ − 1.
for any x * ∈ X , where (a) we use the induction and we let the point x * = x τ −1 and (b) is by the strongly convexity and that
-strongly convex. We have completed the proof of (46). By (46), we have
where we assume that φ(·) is L 0 -Lipchitz.
I Analysis of Accelerated Proximal Method
First, we need a stronger result.
. Then, it satisfies that for any x * ∈ K,
Proof. The statement and its proof has also appeared in [8] and [14] . For completeness, we replicate the proof here. Recall that the Bregman divergence with respect to the distance generating function φ(·) at a point c is:
. Since x + is the optimal point of argmin x∈K F (x), by optimality,
for any x * ∈ K.
Now using the definition of subgradient, we also have
(52) By combining (51) and (52), we have
Recall MIRRORDESCENT 's update x t = argmin x γ t (α t h t (x))+V xt−1 (x), where h t (x) = x, y t + ψ(x). Using the lemma with θ(x) = γ t (α t h t (x)), x + = x t and c = x t−1 we have that 
where (a) holds since the sequence {γ t } is non-increasing and D upper bounds the divergence terms, and (b) follows from the strong convexity of φ, which grants V xt−1 (x t ) ≥ y-player uses OPTIMISITCFTL as OAlg x : y t = ∇f ( x t ).
x-player uses BETHEREGULARIZEDLEADER with R(X) := 6: end for
[1] proposed a FRANKWOLFE like algorithm that not only requires a linear oracle but also enjoys O(1/T 2 ) rate on all the known examples of strongly convex constraint sets that contain the origin, like l p ball and Schatten p ball with p ∈ (1, 2] . Their analysis requires the assumption that the underlying function is also strongly-convex to get the fast rate. To describe their algorithm, denote K be any closed convex set that contains the origin. Define "gauge function" of K as γ K (x) := inf{c ≥ 0 :
x c ∈ K}. Notice that, for a closed convex K that contains the origin, K = {x ∈ R d : γ K (x) ≤ 1}. Furthermore, the boundary points on K satisfy γ K (x) = 1.
[1] showed that the squared of a gauge function is strongly convex on the underlying K for all the known examples of strongly convex sets that contain the origin. Algorithm 7 is the algorithm. Clearly, Algorithm 7 is an instance of the meta-algorithm. We want to emphasize again that our analysis does not need the function f (·) to be strongly convex to show O(1/T 2 ) rate. We've improved their analysis.
K Proof of Theorem 1
For completeness, we replicate the proof by [1] here.
Theorem 1 Assume a T -length sequence α are given. Suppose in Algorithm 1 the online learning algorithms OAlg
x and OAlg y have the α-weighted average regret α-REG x and α-REG y respectively.
Then the output (x T ,ȳ T ) is an ǫ-equilibrium for g(·, ·), with ǫ = α-REG x + α-REG y .
Proof. Suppose that the loss function of the x-player in round t is α t h t (·) : X → R, where h t (·) := g(·, y t ). The y-player, on the other hand, observes her own sequence of loss functions α t ℓ t (·) : Y → R, where ℓ t (·) := −g(x t , ·). Note that sup y∈Y g(x * , y) = f (x * ) be the definition of the game g(·, ·) and by Fenchel conjugacy, hence we can conclude that sup y∈Y g(x * , y) = inf x∈X sup y∈Y g(x, y) = V * = sup y∈Y inf x∈X g(x, y). Combining (57) and (59), we see that: which implies that (x T ,ȳ T ) is an ǫ = α-REG x + α-REG y equilibrium.
